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This paper contributes to the debate about whether or not inflation targeting is compatible with Post 
Keynesian economics. It does so by developing a model that takes into  account the potentially inflationary 
consequences of interest rate manipulations. Evaluations of the macroeconomic implications of this so-called cost 
channel of monetary policy are common in the mainstream literature. But this literature uses supply-determined 
macro models and provides standard optimizing microfoundations for the various ways in which the interest rate can 
affect mark-ups, prices and ultimately the form of the Phillips curve. Our purpose is to study the implications of 
different Phillips curves, each embodying the cost channel and derived from Post Keynesian, cost-based-pricing 
microfoundations, in a monetary-production economy. We focus on the impact of these Phillips curves on 
macroeconomic stability and the consequent efficacy of inflation and output targeting. Ultimately, our results 
suggest that the presence of the cost channel is of less significance than the general orientation of the policy regime, 
and corroborate earlier finding that, in a monetary-production economy, more orthodox policy regimes are inimical 
to macro stabilization. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been some intense debate about whether or not inflation targeting is compatible 
with Post Keynesian economics. As might be expected, several contributors have expressed 
concerns with the potential real costs (in terms of foregone output and employment) of a singular 
focus on low inflation as the goal of macroeconomic policy (see, for example, Atesoglu and 
Smithin, 2006; Rochon and Rossi, 2006). These concerns become acute when inflation targeting 
is taken to involve not just the pursuit of low inflation enshrined in a target that public policy 
authorities credibly and accountably commit to achieve, but also – and more specifically – the 
dedicated use of monetary policy to achieve this goal.1 
According to Setterfield (2006), however,  Post Keynesian concerns with inflation 
targeting can be set aside  once  it is recognized that,  by using more and different policy 
instruments to reconcile the pursuit of low inflation with real macroeconomic policy goals, 
inflation targeting can be accommodated in a monetary-production economy.2  Lima & 
Setterfield (2008) consider further the relationship between inflation targeting and Post 
Keynesian economics by explicitly taking into account the role of expectations in the inflation 
process, and by evaluating the impact of different policy reaction functions on the effects of 
inflation targeting and the stability of macroeconomic equilibrium. Two important results emerge 
from this analysis. First, the potential compatibility of inflation targeting with a Post Keynesian 
economy extends to a broader range of policy interventions than was originally envisaged by 
Setterfield (2006). And second, the more orthodox the policy blend becomes in a Post Keynesian 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Mishkin (2002). Svensson (2010) also identifies inflation targeting with the 
conduct of monetary policy, but notes that low and/or stable inflation may not be the singular 
pursuit of the monetary authorities in an inflation targeting regime. 
2 See also Davidson (2006), Palley (2006), and Sawyer (2006) on the compatibility of inflation 
targeting and Post Keynesian economics.   2 
economy, the more adverse are the consequences for macroeconomic stability and the viability 
of inflation targeting.3 
But an important omission from Lima and Setterfield (2008) is the cost channel of 
monetary policy, according to which interest rates affect costs of production and hence 
(potentially) price dynamics. A second drawback is that Lima and Setterfield’s analysis is based 
on a simple aggregate structural model, the Post Keynesian pedigree of which is justified largely 
by appeal to heuristics. One of the purposes of this paper is to provide proper Post Keynesian 
foundations for the simplified policy model utilized by Lima and Setterfield (2008). These 
foundations  take into account the potentially inflationary consequences of interest rate 
manipulations, arising from the fact that interest rates affect firms’ debt servicing and hence their 
costs of production and (potentially) their pricing decisions.4 Hence a second purpose of the 
paper is to study macroeconomic stability and the efficacy of inflation targeting in a monetary-
production economy characterized by the cost channel of monetary policy. Evaluations of the 
macroeconomic implications of the cost channel are common in the mainstream literature. But 
this literature uses supply-determined macro models and provides standard optimizing 
microfoundations for the various ways in which the interest rate can affect mark-ups, prices and 
                                                 
3 This second result bears a striking resemblance to that of Isaac (1991). The relationship 
between the analysis conducted in this paper and that found in Isaac (1991) is discussed in detail 
in sub-section 2(iv) below. 
4 A recent survey jointly conducted by nine major Eurosystem national central banks covering 
more than 11,000 firms showed that prices are mostly set following some markup rule (Fabiani 
et al., 2006). Firms were also asked to assign scores between 4 (greater importance) and 1 (minor 
importance) to three main cost factors according to their importance for price increases. 
Suggestively, financial costs received an average score of 2.2, while with 3.0 and 3.1 the average 
scores of labor costs and raw material costs, respectively, were not that much higher. 
   3 
ultimately the form of the Phillips curve.5 Our purpose is to study the implications of different 
specifications of a Phillips curve, embodying the cost channel of monetary policy, derived from 
Post Keynesian, cost-based-pricing microfoundations in Lima and Setterfield (2010). While the 
inflationary (and therefore potentially self-defeating) consequences of raising interest rates in an 
effort to fight inflation have been emphasized by several Post Keynesian authors,6 scant (if any) 
attention has been paid to them in the literature debating whether or not inflation targeting is 
compatible with Post Keynesian economics. Ultimately, then, we seek to analyze the stability of 
macroeconomic equilibrium and the consequent possibilities for successful inflation and output 
targeting in a demand-determined economy  characterized by the cost channel of monetary 
policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the structural 
model on which our analysis is based. Section 3 then examines the consequences of the cost 
channel of monetary policy for macroeconomic stability and the efficacy of inflation and output 
targeting in a monetary-production economy. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Model and its Foundations  
i) Some preliminary profit accounting 
  We begin by defining enterprise profits as: 
        E D ι Π =Π−             [1] 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, this literature yields a single specification of the Phillips curve embodying the 
cost channel – a further point of contrast with our own analysis (see also Lima and Setterfield, 
2010). 
6 See, for example, Wray (2007).   4 
where ПE denotes enterprise profits and П denotes gross profits (both in nominal terms), and ιD 
denotes payments to rentiers (ι is the nominal rate of interest and D is the nominal stock of debt). 
Deflating by the price level, P, we get: 
        ER R R D ι Π = Π−           [2] 
where an R-subscript denotes the real value of a variable. The expression in equation [2] can be 
thought of as the “real cash flow” of firms. 
  Since the model we are constructing is of an environment characterized by inflation, we 
will observe the steady depreciation of DR over time, ceteris paribus. We assume that firms will 
take this into account when they calculate enterprise profits. Note that since: 
        / R D DP =  
it follows that:  
        ˆ () RR D D pD = −   
where p is the rate of inflation, so that the depreciation of real debt over time due to inflation can 
be written as: 
        R d pD =             [3] 
Adding the expression for d in [3] to the cash flow concept of (real) enterprise profits in [2], we 
get: 
       
' () ER R R pD ι Π = Π− −           [2a] 
The concept of enterprise profits in [2a] can now be thought of as the “real net profits” of firms. 
Finally, deflating [2a] by the capital stock, K, we get: 
        () E rr p ιζ =−−           [4]   5 
where ζ = DR/K is the debt to capital stock ratio, which we take as given in the short run. 
Equation [4] gives us the real rate of enterprise profits which, as will become clear in what 
follows, enters into the investment and pricing decisions of firms. 
 
ii) Expectations 
Our theory of expectations is based on the work of Gerrard (1994, 1995) and Dequech 
(1999). For any variable x that decision makers are attempting to forecast, we write: 
          ()
e x Ex = Ω           [5] 
where: 
          [  ]
T Ω = ΨΘΦ 
with  Ψ  denoting  decision  makers’  information  set,  Θ  denoting  their  animal  spirits  and  Φ 
denoting their creativity. The idea here is that in an environment of uncertainty, in which there is 
no time-invariant “true model” on which to base forecasts, expectations are a product of what 
decision makers do know (or think they know) about the structure of the data-generating process 
(the incomplete information set, Ψ), the capacity of decision makers to anticipate innovations 
that produce novel change in the structure of the data-generating process (captured by their 
creativity, Φ) and decision makers’ animal spirits (Θ), which influence expectations via their 
effects on “spontaneous optimism” (see Dequech, 1999, p.419). Hence, as in equation [5], x
e is 
conditional on a vector Ω that reflects each of these influences – information, creativity and 
animal spirits – on expectations. 
Note that, in addition to their impact on expectations, animal spirits exert a second and 
separate influence on decision making, as in equation [5]. This is because in an environment of 
uncertainty, behaviour depends not only on expectations themselves, but also on the confidence   6 
with which these expectations are held. A change in animal spirits, by altering decision makers’ 
aversion to and/or perception of uncertainty, can alter the confidence that decision makers have 
in any given set of expectations, and hence their behaviour (Dequech, 1999, p.419). This 
exemplifies what Gerrard (1994, 1995) describes as the “two-step” nature of decision making 
under uncertainty: decision makers first formulate a “most probable forecast” (captured by x
e in 
equation [5]), and then assess the “credence” of this forecast before deciding how to act. In this 
way, anything that affects the “credence” of a forecast can alter behaviour quite independently of 
changes in the forecast itself.7 In this paper, we abstract from these dynamics for the sake of 
simplicity, taking animal spirits as given.8  
                                                 
7  The obvious contrast here is with the canonical version of rational expectations, 
where ' () e x Ex = Ψ  and  ' Ψ  constitutes a complete information set (including the time-invariant 
“true model” of the process generating x), and factors such as animal spirits exert no influence on 
behaviour either indirectly (via x
e) or directly. The key characteristic of rational expectations is 
that they cannot be systematically wrong. In contrast, expectations formed under uncertainty on 
the basis of the incomplete information set ψ can be systematically wrong, and decision makers 
are aware of this – hence the role and importance of the second step in the decision making 
process described above. 
8 In this way, we are “locking up without ignoring” (Kregel, 1976) some of the dynamics of a 
Post Keynesian economy in an effort to focus attention on other dynamics in a “conditionally” or 
“provisionally” closed system (see Setterfield, 1997, 2003 and Chick and Caserta, 1997 
respectively). Closure is conditional or provisional in the precise sense that it depends on our 
ability to treat as unchanging certain features of the economy that are, in principle, subject to 
change over time. Note that the need to introduce such conditional closure cannot be avoided by 
simply adding more equations until our model is expressed in terms of Lucasian “deep 
parameters” and absolute closure is achieved. These “deep parameters” are assumed not to exist 
and the economy is, instead, treated as an open system (see Lawson, 1995). Indeed, this is 
understood to be the source of the fundamental uncertainty that decision makers face in a Post 
Keynesian economy. 
Alternatively, the assumption thatΘ=Θ can be interpreted as an “equilibrium of action” 
(Chick, 2002), in which even in the absence of evidence confirming the realization of 
expectations, decision makers find no basis in current economic events to change the credence 
they attach to these expectations.   7 
In order to render equation [5] explicit, we appeal to the claims originally made by 
Keynes (1936, 1937) that, in an environment of uncertainty, expectations will be heavily 
influenced by recent events and social conventions. In light of this insight, we write: 
     
1
1









Ω = Γ −Γ + − ∑  
where Γ ≤ 1 and xc denotes a salient conventional value of the variable of interest. In other 
words, the expected value of x is modelled as a weighted average of the convention, xc, and a 
distributed lag of past values of x. The parameter k  can be thought of as decreasing in the 
salience and credibility of the conventional value xc.9 In what follows, we assume for simplicity 
that Γ = 1 so that the expected value of any variable x can be written as: 
        1 ( ) (1 ) c E x kx k x − Ω= + −        [6] 
  A simple – but for our purposes, instructive – example of how expectations are formed in 
conjunction with equation [6] arises in the case where x = p. Following Lima and Setterfield 
(2008), we assume that transparent policy rules are good examples of salient social conventions, 
so that if policy authorities engage in inflation targeting – by which we mean the pursuit of a 
clearly announced target rate of inflation, p
T, that policy makers credibly and accountably 
commit to achieve – then xc = p
T. In this case, we can write: 
        1 ( ) (1 )
eT
p E p p kp k p − Ω= = +−       [6a] 
                                                 
9 We treat k as a constant in this analysis, but it is easy to imagine that it need not be. For 
example, given what has been said above, the value of k may change over time in response to 
discrepancies between xc and the actual value of x, to the extent that such discrepancies are 
understood to reduce the credibility of xc. The value of k may also vary with the extent and 
effectiveness of communication between policy makers and the private sector (on which see, for 
example, Blinder et al, 2008) in cases where xc is a policy convention (on which, see below). In 
such cases, communication may affect either the salience or the credibility of xc (or both).   8 
Note that in this particular case, k will be decreasing in the transparency of policy makers’ target 
rate of inflation, and the credibility of their commitment to achieve this inflation target. 
 
iii) The AD curve 
  We begin by specifying a Kaleckian model of the form: 
       
ee
u rE g gu gr γ = ++           [7] 
       
s g sr π =             [8] 





=             [9] 
Equation [7] is a standard neo-Kaleckian investment function in which the rate of accumulation 
depends on the expected rates of utilization and (enterprise) profits. Equation [8] is the 
Cambridge equation, and equation [9] is true by definition.10 
  Drawing on the accounting relationship in equation [4], we write: 





In other words, the expected rate of enterprise profits earned on whatever volume of capital 
goods are acquired in the present period will depend on the expected future gross profits earned 
by this capital (r
e), less interest payments on the debt undertaken to acquire this capital ([ι
e – 
p
e]ζ). This latter term reflects the value of the debt to capital stock ratio, ζ (which is assumed 
                                                 
10 Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that investment is the only interest-sensitive 
component of aggregate spending. By abstracting from interest-sensitive components of 
consumption expenditure, we are also able to abstract, in our description of wage-setting 
behaviour in sub-section 2(iv) below, from any direct impact of interest rates on the wage 
bargain that might follow from households bearing a debt-service burden. 
  Note also  that, since  () E rr p ιζ = +−   from [4], we are implicitly assuming in [8] that 
capitalists and rentier households (the only classes contributing to aggregate saving) have the 
same propensity to save.   9 
fixed  in the short run),  and  the expected rates of inflation (p
e)  and nominal interest (ι
e). 
Substituting the expression for 
e
E r  stated above into equation [7], we arrive at: 
      ( [ ])
e eee
ur g gu g r p γ ιζ = + + −−         [10] 
Now let: 








i.e., we assume that firms’ profit and utilization expectations are consistent (with the identity in 
[9] that relates r and u).11 Substituting into [10] yields: 








−  = + + −−  
      [11] 
Finally, drawing on the theory of expectations outlined in the previous sub-section (and again 
assuming Г = 1), we write: 
      1 (1 )
eT
uu u ku k u − = +− 
where: 






is the salient, conventional value of u that (given v and K) is derived from the target level of 
output y
T that informs policy making.12 We also write: 
      1 (1 )
eT kk ιι ιι ι − = +− 
                                                 
11 Note that the above expression for the expected rate of profit features the actual (rather than 
expected) wage share, ω . In sub-section 2(iv) below, our approach to modelling wage and price 
dynamics will imply that the equilibrium wage share – and hence, by definition, the 
equilibrium size of the markup – is consistent with firms’ target wage share, and hence 
can be treated as a constant. 
12 In this model, the parameter y
T is understood to be a policy choice. Policy makers, however, 
may interpret y
T as a “natural” level of output. The consequences of this possibility are 
investigated in sub-section 2(vi) below.   10 
which, setting kι = 1 on the basis that there is no salient conventional value of ι that can be 
derived from policy makers’ behaviour,13 reduces to: 
      1
e ιι − =  
Substituting into [11] (and re-arranging) yields: 
1 11
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) [ ]
Te u r
u u uu r
k g
g k u g gku g u p
vv
ω ω
γ ιζ − −−
− −   =+− + + + − −   
 
If we now solve this last expression in conjunction with equations [7] and [8] under the 
equilibrium conditions g = g
s, u = u-1, and ι = ι-1, we arrive at:14 
(1 )






ku g g p v
v
u




 −  +− + − −     =
− −−
    [12] 
Finally, since: 





                                                 
13 As will become clear, this is consistent with the policy rules introduced in sub-section 2(vi) 
below, in which the value of the nominal interest rate is indeterminate. If firms’ decision making 
involves a normal rate of interest, ιn – on which, see sub-section 2(iv) below – then it is plausible 
to conjecture that  1 (1 )
e
n kk ιι ιι ι − = +−. This reformulation of ι
e would affect the evaluation of δ in 
equation [14] as discussed in sub-section 2(v) below, by implying that  //
e dy d dy dp ι ≠  by virtue 
of the introduction of kι into the first of these derivatives. But since kι is assumed constant, this 
would have no material effect on the dynamical analysis in section 3. 
14 Note that if ku = 1 (so that u
e = u-1 as in the standard Kaleckian model), then the expression in 
[12] reduces to: 
















It is conventional to assume that  []
e








, so that the outcome in the 
expression above is both positive and stable. Note that if the first of these conditions holds, the 





s gk π ω

>+  − 
, since ku   11 
it follows on the basis of [12] that: 
   
(1 )






ku g g p K
v
y




 −  +− + − −     =
− −−
    [13] 
This aggregate demand curve can be written in simplified form as: 
        0 ()
e yy p δι = −−           [14] 
The precise relationship between the parameters of [14] and those of equation [13] will be made 
clear following the discussion of pricing behaviour below, since (as will become clear) the latter 
impinges upon this relationship. 
 
iv) Wage and price dynamics 
Our approach to modelling wage and price dynamics is informed by the theory of target 
return pricing, in conjunction with insights from the conflicting claims theory of inflation.15 
Throughout our analysis, we assume that firms set prices in conjunction with the equation: 
        P = κWa            [15] 
where P is the price level, κ is the gross mark up (one plus the percentage margin for gross 
profits), W is the nominal wage and a is the labour to output ratio (which is assumed fixed). In 
                                                                                                                                                             
< 1 by assumption. In other words, the standard Kaleckian existence and stability conditions 
suffice to ensure the existence and stability of the equilibrium rate of capacity utilization in [12]. 
15 The analysis in this sub-section is based on Lima and Setterfield (2010). Rowthorn (1977) 
develops an early model of conflict inflation, while Lavoie (1992, chpt. 7) and Burdekin and 
Burkett (1996) provide surveys of the conflicting claims approach. See Lee (1998) and Lavoie 
(1992, pp.129—33) for discussion of target return pricing procedures, and Lee (1998, p.206) for 
evidence of the use of target return pricing by firms. Note that target return pricing can be related 
to the cost plus pricing models of Wood (1975), Harcourt and Kenyon (1976) and Eichner (1987) 
that emphasize the influence of investment and growth on the size of the mark up. See, for 
example, Lavoie (1992, p.133).   12 
what follows, we explore several possible specifications of [15], each of which is consistent with 
the notion that firms’ pricing decisions are sensitive to (inter alia) the interest rate.16 
We begin by hypothesizing that: 
        ˆ () F κ ψω ω = −           [16] 
where  ω  and  ωF  are the actual  wage share and firms’ target wage share, respectively.17 
According to [16], the mark-up grows in response to any disparity between the actual wage share 
and firms’ target wage share, an idea that is well established in the conflicting-claims literature. 
Since it follows from [15] that: 
        ˆ pw κ = +            [17] 
(recalling that a is a constant), substituting [16] into [17] we get: 
        () F pw ψω ω = −+           [18] 
as our initial description of the rate of inflation. 
Appealing once again to conflicting-claims theory, we now write: 
        ()
e
W wp τω ω σ = −+   
and: 
        yZ τη χ = + 
where  W ω  is the target wage share of workers, Z reflects institutional determinants of the ability 
and willingness of workers to raise nominal wages, and p
e is determined as in equation [6a]. 
Together, these expressions imply that: 
        ( )( )
e
W w yZ p η χω ωσ = + −+      [19] 
                                                 
16 See Lima and Setterfield (2010) for fuller investigation of these and other examples of this 
cost channel of monetary policy. 
17 Since a is exogenously given, the actual (target) wage share is equivalent to the actual (target) 
real wage, both here and throughout our analysis.   13 
According to equation [19], the growth of nominal wages depends on inflation expectations, the 
gap between workers’ target wage share and the actual wage share, and both the state of the real 
economy and the institutional structure of the labour market (which influence the willingness 
and/or ability of workers to bargain for a higher real wage, and hence the size of τ).18 
  An important feature of conflicting claims models of inflation is that their equilibrium 
solutions describe both the rate of inflation and the value of the wage share. In order to derive an 
expression for the  short-run Phillips curve (SRPC) that is consistent with the equilibrium 
conditions of the conflicting claims process, we therefore need to consider the situation where 
the wage share is constant (at its equilibrium value) in order to further our analysis. From the 
definition of the wage share, a constant wage share implies that p = w (recalling once again that 
a is constant). Substituting this condition into [18], we get: 
        F ωω =             [20] 
In other words, the equilibrium wage share – and hence, by definition, the equilibrium size of κ = 
P/Wa = 1/ω – is consistent with firms’ target wage share. If we now substitute [20] into [19] and 
again use the condition p = w, we arrive at a SRPC of the form:19 
        ( )( )
e
WF p yZ p ηχωω σ =+ −+      [21] 
So far, however, our model appears to make no connection between interest rates, prices 
and inflation. But suppose – consistent with the theory of target return pricing – that what is 
                                                 
18 The parameter σ will also likely vary with y and Z, but this is overlooked for the sake of 
simplicity. 
19 It may be more accurate to refer to equation [21] (and the Phillips curves that follow) as quasi-
SRPCs, since some of the disequilibrium adjustment mechanisms that can be properly associated 
with the short period, such as the adjustment of ω towards ωF described in [16] and (in 
subsequent expressions) the adjustment of ι
e towards ι, are absent, assumed (for the sake of 
simplicity) to have been previously resolved. It should be noted that this has no effect on the 
results reported in the next section. We are grateful to Søren Harck of the University of Aarhus 
for drawing this matter to our attention.   14 
driving the equilibrium value of κ established by firms is a target rate of return on their capital, 
r
T. Drawing on equation [9], we can write: 
       












ω = −             [22] 
where un denotes the normal rate of capacity utilization at which the target rate of return, r
T, is 
calculated. In other words, firms’ target wage share (the inverse of the equilibrium mark up) is 
ultimately explained by a target rate of return (given the values of v and un).20 Furthermore, 
referring back once again to the accounting relationship in equation [4], we can write: 
        ()
TTee
E rr p ιζ =+−           [23] 
In other words, the target rate of return which determines firms’ target wage share depends on 
firms’ target rate of enterprise profits, together with their expectations of inflation and the 
nominal interest rate. Given that kι = 1 so that ι
e = ι-1, and assuming that ι-1 = ι, substituting [23] 
into [22] yields:21 












= −         [24] 
Finally, substituting [24] into [21] yields: 
                                                 
20 If 
T
n uu ≠  – as is plausible in the short run – the it might be argued that both un and u
T should 
feature in the calculation of firms’ utilization expectations, a possibility that has not been taken 
into account heretofore. However, since both un and u
T are constants in our analysis and will 
therefore have no effect on the macrodynamics in section 3, we abstract from this possibility for 
the sake of simplicity. 
21 Note that not all variants of target return pricing admit a role for the interest rate in the 
determination of the mark up in this fashion. See, for example, Lavoie (1992, pp.360—1; 1995) 
on the pricing theory of Eichner (1987).   15 













= + −− +  
  
   [25] 
This is essentially a conventional SRPC, in which p is increasing in p
e, y (given the conventional 
assumption that  WF ωω > )  and  the nominal interest rate, ι. Linearizing [25] for the sake of 
simplicity, we can now write (as an approximation of the inflation process): 
      ()
ee p p yZ p β ϕ α θ ει = + +++−         [26] 
Note, however, that according to [23], the target rate of return and hence the equilibrium 
mark up will vary every time the expected nominal interest rate changes. But mark ups are 
conventionally regarded as fixed for discrete intervals of time. In light of this observation, it 
might be more accurate to describe the target rate of return as: 
        ()
TT e
En rr p ιζ =+−           [23a] 
where ιn is what firms regard as the normal rate of interest. The normal rate of interest is taken as 
given in what follows,22  and is understood (over the time horizon of this model) to be 
conceptually different from the expected rate of interest that featured in  the derivation of 
equation [25]. Substituting [23a] into [22] and the result into [21], we now get an SRPC of the 
form: 













= + −− +  
  
  [25a] 
                                                 
22 The “normal” rate of interest may change over time in response to firms’ experience of 
prevailing actual rates of interest (see Lima and Setterfield, 2010, pp.32). But any impact that 
this might have on the macrodynamics of the system under construction can be thought of as 
being approximated by the previous case where ι rather than ιn enters the SRPC, since  n ιι =   is the 
most extreme form of adjustment of the normal rate of interest in reponse to changes in the 
actual rate. Indeed, in light of this last observation, unless there is a qualitative difference 
between the macrodynamics of systems in which the target rate of return is formulated as in 
[23a] rather than [23], there would seem to be no point in exploring the impact of other, more 
gradual adjustments of ιn in response to changes in ι on the properties of the system.   16 
and linearizing this result yields: 
      ()
ee
n p p yZ p β ϕ α θ ει = + +++ −         [26a] 
  The analysis above provides us with two different but plausible specifications of the 
SRPC (in equations [26] and [26a]), each of which is consistent with the basic principles of 
target-return pricing and conflicting claims inflation theory, and each of which incorporates 
some variant of the cost channel of monetary policy, according to which interest rates enter into 
firms’ cost accounting, and hence their pricing decisions, and hence inflation. 
 
v) On the foundations of the AD curve once more 
  We are now in a position to make  a more definite statement about the relationship 
between the parameters of equation [14] – and in particular, δ – and the parameters of equation 
[13]. First, it is evident from [13] that the partial derivative of y with respect to 
e
R p ιι = − is:23 












But we now also know (from the discussion in sub-section 2(iv) above) that: 
        F ωω =  
and that either: 












= −  
or: 












= −  






s gk π ω

>+  − 
.   17 
In other words, any increase (decrease) in the nominal interest rate that causes an increase 
(decrease) in the actual real interest rate will either reduce (increase) or leave unchanged the 
value of the wage share, ω, and hence either increase (reduce) or leave unchanged the value of 
the gross profit share, 1 – ω.24 In short: 










And since it follows from [13] that:25 
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it therefore follows that the total derivative of y with respect to ιR – and hence the value of δ in 
equation [14] – is given by: 
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24 In other words, if firms pass on interest costs in the form of higher prices, an increase in the 
interest rate effectively redistributes income from wages to rents. This calls attention to the fact 
that even though we have assumed that households do not carry debt, it is possible for the wage 
bargain to be affected by monetary policy. For instance, in this case the possibility arises 
(following Pivetti 1991) that since the normal profit of the enterprise does not depend on the 
behaviour of any component of total unit cost other than interest expenses, wage bargaining – in 
order to have any permanent effect on income distribution – will seek to influence the interest 
rate. Though we abstract from this possibility in what follows, we would nevertheless identify 
the relationship between the interest rate, wage formation and hence prices and price inflation as 
an important topic for further research into the precise workings –  and implications for 
macroeconomic stability – of the cost channel of monetary policy. 
25 Recall that  []
e
r gp γιζ >− .   18 
vi) Policy reaction functions 
  Our model features two policy reaction functions –  one describing the pursuit of 
monetary policy, the second describing adjustments to labour market institutions – which we use 
to characterize two different macroeconomic policy regimes.26 Initially, we write: 
        ()
eT p yy ιλ = +−             [27] 
        ()
T Z pp µ = −−            [28] 
This (with 
e pp =  ) corresponds to Lima and Setterfield’s (2008) basic Post-Keynesian policy 
regime, in which monetary policy is used to target output, and labour market institutions are 
adjusted in an effort to control inflation – in other words, the policy authorities pursue some form 
of incomes policy.27 We also consider the “inverted” policy reaction functions: 
        ()
eT p pp ιλ = +−             [27a] 
        ()
T Z yy µ = −−            [28a] 
This  (again with 
e pp =  )  corresponds to Lima  and Setterfield’s (2008) simplified orthodox 
policy regime, in which monetary policy is used to target inflation, and elected policy authorities 
claim to be increasing labour market “flexibility’ – interpreted in [28a] as increasing worker 
insecurity and hence reducing the ability of workers to bargain for nominal wage increases – in 
an effort to reduce a perceived “natural” rate of unemployment associated with the real policy 
target y
T.28 
                                                 
26 For more extensive discussion of these policy reaction functions and other policy regimes 
associated with them, see Lima and Setterfield (2008). 
27 The idea of adjusting an incomes policy in the pursuit of short-run stabilization may seem 
strange. But note that in tax-based incomes policies (see, for example, Wallich and Weintraub, 
1971), the policy instrument is a tax rate which could, in principle, be varied in the short run. 
28 According to [28a], such policy initiatives will be easiest to pursue during booms (y > y
T), but 
may be resisted during downturns (y < y
T). See Lima and Setterfield (2008, pp.454-5) for further 
discussion.   19 
  By considering the two pairs of policy reaction functions [27]-[28] and [27a]-[28a], our 
modelling exercise can essentially be seen as updating and extending the earlier work of Isaac 
(1991). Like Isaac, we consider a monetary-production economy characterized by conflicting 
claims inflation, in which a crucial distinction exists between monetary policy that is sensitive to 
the real economy (as in [27]) and monetary policy that is insensitive to the real economy (as in 
[27a]). But whereas Isaac’s monetary policy regimes describe monetarist and non-monetarist 
money supply growth rules, we update the description of monetary policy so that it is couched in 
terms of interest rate operating procedures. In our model, the interest rate is the instrument of 
monetary policy, and the quantity of money in circulation is rendered endogenous (to the credit 
demands of the non-bank private sector) regardless of the precise monetary policy regime. At 
the same time, we extend Isaac’s analysis by introducing a second policy instrument (Z), 
allowing us to distinguish between more and less orthodox macroeconomic policy regimes in 
additional detail (as in equations [28] and [28a]), in a model with two policy objectives (y and p) 
and two policy instruments (ι and Z). 
 
 
vii) The complete model 
  Our complete structural model can now be stated as follows: 
Aggregate demand:      0 ()
e yy p δι = −−         [14] 
Phillips curve:       ()
ee p p yZ p β ϕ α θ ει = + +++−     [26] 
      or:    ()
ee
n p p yZ p β ϕ α θ ει = + +++ −     [26a] 
                                                                                                                                                             
  Again, it may appear odd to think of adjusting labour market institutions in the short run, 
But note that the sort of “institutions” that policy makers would seek to vary in accordance with 
[28a] include unemployment benefit generosity and the value of the minimum wage – which are, 
once again, potentially amenable to change in the short run.   20 
Inflation expectations:    1 (1 )
eT p kp k p − = +−         [6a] 
      where:   0 k =   
Economic policy:      ()
eT p yy ιλ = +−           [27] 
          ()
T Z pp µ = −−          [28] 
      or: 
          ()
eT p pp ιλ = +−           [27a] 
          ()
T Z yy µ = −−          [28a] 
 
3. Implications of the cost-push channel of monetary transmission 
Before we turn to assess the impact of the policy regimes described by [27]-[28] and 
[27a]-[28a] on the possibilities for successful inflation and output targeting and the stability of 
macroeconomic equilibrium, we should first recall the corresponding results derived by Lima 
and Setterfield (2008) using a simpler model (with no cost channel). In an economy described by 
equation  [14]  (with 
e pp = ), equation  [26]  (with  0 ε = ), equation [6a]  (with  0 k =   and 
0
eT pp = =  ), and equations [27] (with 
e pp = ) and [28], the policy authorities set and pursue 
output and inflation  targets that are, in turn, revealed to comprise the stable equilibrium 
configuration of the economy. This establishes  what Setterfield (2006) defines as the full 
compatibility of inflation targeting with the underlying structure of the economy: not only are the 
policy authorities able to both set and achieve an inflation target (establishing the partial 
compatibility of inflation targeting with the economy), they are able to do so without real costs 
and hence without thwarting the achievement of any output  target set independently of p
T 
(establishing full compatibility). Indeed, the policy authorities can change their inflation target   21 
and still meet this target without affecting the real economy (and hence their ability to achieve 
any freely chosen, as far as inflation is concerned, output target). By the same token, policy 
makers can also set and pursue an output target without any fear of it having inflationary 
consequences. 
Meanwhile, in an economy described by the same simplified versions of equations [14], 
[26] and [6a] described above, but with the policy mix given by [27a]-[28a], full compatibility 
obtains only in exceptional circumstances. In general, the policy authorities set and pursue output 
and inflation targets that are revealed as the unstable equilibrium configuration of the economy. 
Hence even the partial compatibility of inflation targeting with the underlying structure of the 
economy is lost: the policy authorities are unable to both set and (in general) achieve an inflation 
target. Only if, by chance, the economy happens to be on the stable arm of its saddle-point will 
an  equilibrium  consistent with 
T pp =   and 
T yy =   be reached. In this quite exceptional 
circumstance, full compatibility of inflation targeting with the economy is observed. 
We now turn to assess the impact of the pairs of policy reaction functions given by [27]-
[28] and [27a]-[28a] on both the feasibility  of inflation targeting and the stability of 
macroeconomic equilibrium in the economy described by [14], [26] and [6a], starting with the 
policy mix given by [27] and [28]. First, note that from [14] we obtain: 
        ()
e yp δι = −−             [29] 
Meanwhile, it follows from [6a] that: 
11
e TTT p kp kp p kp kp −− = + +− −      
from which, given  0 k =   and assuming  0
T p =  , it follows that: 
1
e p kp− =              [30] 
Now note that, by definition, we have:   22 
1 p p pt − = −∆   
from which it follows that: 
1 p p pt − = −∆     
and finally, assuming  0 p =   and substituting the resulting expression into [30] above, we obtain: 
e p kp =              [31] 
Substitution of this expression and [27] into [29] then yields: 
()
T y yy δλ = −−            [32] 
Finally, it follows from [26] that: 
()
ee p p yZ p ϕ α θ ει = +++−       
from which, by utilizing [27], [28] [31] and [32], we obtain: 
     
1
[ ( )( ) ( )]
(1 )
TT p yy pp
k
λ ε αδ θµ
ϕ
= − −− −
−
     [33] 
Equations [32] and [33] constitute a planar autonomous two-dimensional system of linear 
differential equations in which the rates of change of  y  and  p  depend on the levels of  y  and 
p , and on various parameters. Solving for the equilibrium configuration by imposing  0 yp = =   
on equations [32] and [33], we obtain the following isoclines: 
       
T yy =              [34] 
and: 
     
() ()
TT yy p p
θµ θµ
λ ε αδ λ ε αδ
= −+
−−
      [35] 
It follows from these isoclines that 
* T yy =   and 
* T pp = , which means that the 
equilibrium configuration of the economy is characterized by the achievement of both policy   23 
targets. Meanwhile, the matrix J of partial derivatives for this dynamic system, from which the 
stability properties of the corresponding equilibrium configuration can be computed, is given by: 
11 J yy δλ = ∂ ∂= −   
12 0 J yp = ∂∂=   
21 ( ) / (1 ) J py k λ ε αδ ϕ = ∂ ∂= − −   
22 / (1 ) J pp k θµ ϕ = ∂ ∂= − −   
A necessary condition for stability of the equilibrium configuration represented by 
* T yy =  and 
* T pp =  is  Det( ) / (1 ) 0 Jk δλθµ ϕ = −> , which is automatically satisfied given our 
assumptions that 01 ϕ <<   and  01 k ≤≤ .  Another necessary condition for stability of the 
equilibrium solution is  11 22 Tr( ) 0 JJJ =+< , which is therefore likewise automatically 
satisfied. 29 Hence the equilibrium configuration given by 
* T yy =  and 
* T pp =  is stable when 
macroeconomic policy is conducted according to the reaction functions given by [27] and [28]. 
Moreover, this is so no matter how strong the cost channel of monetary policy happens to be – 
i.e., regardless of the size of ε . 
In the economy described by equations [14], [26], [6a], [27], and [28], then, the policy 
authorities are able to set and pursue output and inflation targets that are revealed to comprise the 
stable equilibrium configuration of the economy. As in the basic model elaborated in Lima and 
Setterfield (2008) – a special case of the model analyzed above which assumes that aggregate 
demand depends on the actual real interest rate, monetary policy is conducted by manipulating 
the actual real interest rate  and  0 k ε = =   –  we observe the  full  compatibility of inflation 
targeting with the underlying structure of the economy. It follows that the cost channel is not   24 
disruptive  to the functioning of a Post Keynesian economy in which policy is pursued in 
accordance with [27] and [28].30 All of the original results found in Lima and Setterfield (2008) 
regarding macro stability and the full compatibility of inflation targeting with the structure of the 
economy still go through.Graphically, the  0 y =   isocline (given by [34]) is parallel to the  p  axis, 
while the  0 p =   isocline (given by [35]) is positively (negatively) sloped if ε αδ >  (ε αδ < ), 
that is, if the cost-push channel in the Phillips curve (measured by ε ) is stronger (weaker) than 
the standard demand-pull channel of monetary transmission (measured by αδ ). In either case, 
since  / yy ∂∂   is negative,  y   undergoes a steady decrease as  y  increases, so that the sign of  y   is 
positive (negative) below (above) the  0 y =   locus. Meanwhile, given that  / pp ∂∂   is negative,  p   
undergoes a steady fall as  p  rises, with the sign of  p   then being positive (negative) to the left 
(right) of the  0 p =    isoclines. Therefore, the equilibrium configuration given by 
** (,)(, )
TT yp yp =   is  a stable node,  which implies that both  output and inflation converge 
monotonically (and hence with no over- or undershooting) to their corresponding equilibrium 
values. 
Let us now turn to assess the impact of the pair of policy reaction functions given by 
[27a]-[28a] on the feasibility  of inflation targeting and the stability of macroeconomic 
equilibrium in the economy described by [14], [26] and [6a]. First, recall that it follows from 
[14] that: 
        ()
e yp δι = −−             [29] 
Substitution of [27a] into the above expression then yields: 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 Note that  01 ϕ <<  is not a necessary condition for stability, as the necessary and sufficient 
condition for stability given by  1 k ϕ <  can be satisfied even when  1 ϕ > .  
30 Nor are heterogeneous expectations – i.e., k ≠ 0.   25 
()
T y pp δλ = −−            [36] 
Now recall that it follows from [26] that: 
()
ee p p yZ p ϕ α θ ει = +++−       
from which, by utilizing [27a], [28a], [31] and [36], we obtain: 
   
1
[ ( )( ) ( )]
(1 )
TT p pp yy
k
λ ε αδ θµ
ϕ
= − −− −
−
       [37] 
Equations [36] and [37] constitute another planar autonomous two-dimensional system of 
linear differential equations in which the rates of change of  y  and  p  depend on the levels of  y  
and  p , and on parameters. Solving for the equilibrium configuration by imposing  0 yp = =  , we 
arrive at the following isoclines: 
       
T pp =             [38] 
and: 
     
() ()
TT pp y y
θµ θµ
λ ε αδ λ ε αδ
= −+
−−
      [39] 
It follows from these isoclines that 
* T yy =   and 
* T pp = ,  so that the equilibrium 
configuration is again characterized by the achievement of both policy targets. Note, however, 
that this equilibrium configuration is saddle-point unstable. This can be verified by reference to 
the matrix J of partial derivatives for this dynamic system, which is given by: 
11 0 J yy = ∂ ∂=   
12 J yp δλ = ∂∂= −   
21 / (1 ) J py k θµ ϕ = ∂ ∂= − −   
22 ( ) / (1 ) J pp k λ ε αδ ϕ = ∂ ∂= − −     26 
The elements of the Jacobian described above imply that Det( ) / (1 ) 0 Jk δλθµ ϕ = − −< , which is 
a  necessary  and sufficient condition for saddle-point instability of the equilibrium solution 
represented by 
* T yy =  and 
* T pp = . Stability would only ever be observed if  1 k ϕ >  (which 
requires  1 ϕ > , since 01 k ≤≤ ), as this would make for Det( ) 0 J > . With  1 k ϕ > , stability is then 
ensured by ε αδ >  – i.e., a sufficiently strong cost channel – which makes  () 0 Tr J < . But in 
terms of the standard treatment of inflation expectations in the wage equation – which suggests 
either that there is full indexation of expected inflation in nominal wage growth (φ = 1, the 
neoclassical case) or else there is incomplete indexation (φ < 1, the heterodox case) – φ > 1 
cannot be considered economically meaningful. We are therefore left with the conclusion that 
pursuing a simplified policy orthodoxy in a Post Keynesian economy where the cost channel 
operates through the effect of the actual nominal interest rate on pricing behaviour is de-
stabilizing. Once again, this is identical to the result in Lima and Setterfield (2008). This, in turn, 
suggests that it is the choice of policy regime, rather than the existence and strength of a cost 
channel, that most seriously affect the functioning of a monetary production economy in which 
inflation targeting is attempted. 
  This claim is only reinforced if we reconsider the micro-foundations of the pricing 
decision and, in so doing, replace the SRPC in [26] with that in [26a]. Hence consider first the 
impact of the policy reaction functions given by [27]-[28] on both the feasibility of inflation 
targeting and the stability of macroeconomic equilibrium in an economy whose Phillips curve is 
given by [26a], in which the rate of inflation varies positively with the real normal interest rate. 
First, recall that from [14] we obtain: 
        ()
e yp δι = −−             [29] 
Meanwhile, substitution of [27] into the above expression yields:   27 
()
T y yy δλ = −−            [32] 
Now note that it follows from [26a] (assuming  0 n ι =  ) that: 
ee p p yZp ϕ αθε = ++−      
from which, by utilizing [27], [28] and [31], we obtain: 
      [ ( ) ( )]









Equations [32] and [40] constitute a third planar autonomous two-dimensional system of 
linear differential equations in which the rates of change of  y  and  p  depend on the levels of  y  
and  p , and on various  parameters. Solving for the equilibrium configuration by imposing 
0 yp = =   on equations [32] and [40], we obtain the following isoclines: 
       
T yy =              [41] 
and: 
     
TT yy p p
θµ θµ
αδλ αδλ
= +−           [42] 
It follows from these isoclines that 
* T yy =  and 
* T pp = , which means that, once again, 
the equilibrium  configuration is characterized by the achievement of both  policy  targets. 
Meanwhile, the matrix J of partial derivatives for this dynamic system, from which the stability 
properties of the corresponding equilibrium configuration can be computed, is given by: 
11 J yy δλ = ∂ ∂= −   
12 0 J yp = ∂∂=   
21 J py A αδλ = ∂ ∂= −     28 
22 J pp A θµ = ∂ ∂= −   
A necessary condition for stability of the equilibrium configuration represented by 
* T yy =   and 
* T pp =   is  Det( ) 0 JA δλθµ = > , which is automatically satisfied given our 
assumptions that 01 ϕ <<  and  01 k ≤≤  (which together imply that  0 A > ). Another necessary 
condition for stability of the equilibrium solution is  11 22 Tr( ) 0 JJJ =+< , which is likewise 
automatically satisfied. Hence the equilibrium configuration given by 
* T yy =  and 
* T pp =  is 
stable when macroeconomic policy is conducted according to the reaction functions given by 
[27] and [28]. Moreover, this is so regardless of the strength of the cost channel of monetary 
policy (i.e., no matter what the size of ε ). In the economy described by equations [14], [26a], 
[6a], [27], and [28], then, we observe full compatibility of inflation targeting with the underlying 
structure of the economy: not only are the policy authorities able to both set and achieve an 
inflation target (establishing the partial compatibility of inflation targeting with the structure of 
economy), they are able to do so without real costs and therefore without thwarting the 
achievement of any output target set independently of p
T. Another point that this analysis makes 
clear is that the question as to whether it is the actual or the normal rate of interest that affects 
firms’ pricing decisions makes no difference to the efficacy of inflation targeting in a Post 
Keynesian economy.31 
Let us now turn to assess the impact of the pair of policy reaction functions given by 
[27a]-[28a] on the desirability of inflation targeting and the stability of macroeconomic 
equilibrium in the economy described by [14], [26a] and [6a]. First, recall that it follows from 
[14] that:   29 
        ()
e yp δι = −−             [29] 
Substitution of [27a] into the above expression then yields: 
()
T y pp δλ = −−            [36] 
Now recall that it follows from [26a] that: 
ee p p yZp ϕ αθε = ++−      
from which, by utilizing [27a], [28a] and [31], we obtain: 
      [ ( ) ( )]
TT p A pp yy αδλ θµ = − −+ −          [43] 








Equations [36] and [43] constitute another planar autonomous two-dimensional system of 
linear differential equations in which the rates of change of  y  and  p  depend on the levels of  y  
and  p , and on parameters. Solving for the equilibrium configuration by imposing  0 yp = =  , we 
arrive at the following isoclines: 
       
T pp =             [44] 
and: 
     
TT pp y y
θµ θµ
αδλ αδλ
= +−           [45] 
It follows from these isoclines that 
* T yy =  and 
* T pp =  – the now familiar result that 
the equilibrium configuration of the economy is characterized by the achievement of both policy 
targets. Note, however, that this equilibrium configuration is saddle-point unstable. This can be 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 This observation, together with the results reported below, bears out the notion alluded to 
earlier, that we can safely abstract from variations in ιn in response to changes in ι without 
affecting the generality of our results.   30 
verified by noting that the matrix J of partial derivatives for this dynamic system, which is given 
by: 
11 0 J yy = ∂ ∂=   
12 J yp δλ = ∂∂= −   
21 J py A θµ = ∂ ∂= −   
22 J pp A αδλ = ∂ ∂= −   
implies that Det( ) 0 JA δλθµ = −<  (recall that 01 ϕ <<  and 01 k ≤≤ , so that  0 A > ), which is a 
necessary  and sufficient condition for saddle-point instability of the equilibrium solution 
represented by 
* T yy =  and 
* T pp = . A necessary condition for stability in this case is  0 A< , 
which would make Det( ) 0 J > . But this is economically meaningless, because it would require 
1 ϕ > .32 Moreover,  0 A<  would mean that  () 0 Tr J > , thwarting stability. In short, the more 
orthodox policy regime  inevitably  renders  the equilibrium configuration of the economy 
unstable. In contrast to the case where the same economy is subject to the policy interventions 
described in equations [27] and [28], the pursuit of a simplified policy orthodoxy (as in equations 
[27a] and [28a]) diminishes the prospects for stability to the special case where the economy 
begins somewhere on the stable arm of the saddle point represented by the equilibrium solution 
y
*  = y
T  and  p
*  = p
T.  These conclusions hold whatever the strength of the cost  channel  of 
monetary policy – i.e., regardless of the size of ε .33 
 
                                                 
32 Again, the standard assumptions are that either φ = 1 (full indexation) or else φ < 1 
(incomplete indexation). 
33 As a final experiment, we analyzed the implications of Lima and Setterfield’s (2008, p.460) 
“full policy orthodoxy” regime for macroeconomic stability and the pursuit of inflation targeting 
in the presence of the cost channel. This policy regime was found to make the economy 
unambiguously unstable, regardless of the strength of the cost channel (i.e., the size of ε).   31 
4. Conclusions 
Post Keynesian macroeconomists are inclined to be skeptical  of inflation targeting, 
because of the frequent neglect of the real costs that such policies can entail. According to Lima 
and Setterfield (2008), however, it is possible to pursue inflation targeting in a Post Keynesian 
economy without detrimental real effects, as long as an appropriate policy regime is adopted. But 
one important shortcoming of these results is Lima and Setterfield’s complete neglect of the cost 
channel of monetary policy, according to which changes in interest rates affect the costs of 
production and hence (potentially) price dynamics. 
The purpose of this paper has been to: a) provide a proper foundation in Post Keynesian 
macro- and micro-principles for the simplified policy model utilized by Lima and Setterfield; b) 
incorporate the cost channel of monetary policy into the price dynamics of this model; and c) 
study the stability of, and efficacy of inflation targeting in, the resulting monetary-production 
economy, under different (more and less orthodox) policy regimes. The key result that our 
analysis produces is that Lima and Setterfield’s (2008) conclusions survive the introduction of 
the cost channel. Specifically: 
-  the appropriate (Post Keynesian) policy mix can successfully stabilize the economy and 
deliver full compatibility of inflation targeting  with the underlying structure of  the 
economy 
-  the more orthodox the policy mix becomes, the graver the consequences for stability and 
the potential success of inflation targeting 
-  it follows that the problem with inflation targeting is not so much whether it is pursued as 
how. In other words,  it is the precise  policy regime that is potentially harmful to 
economic  performance  in a monetary production economy, rather than the policy 
objective (of low inflation) per se.   32 
These conclusions (and the results on which they are based) are robust to switching between the 
normal and the actual rate of interest in the pricing decision from which the aggregate Phillips 
curve relationship is derived. 
At first sight, the conclusions reached above may seem to be nothing more than common 
sense, because unlike the orthodox policy regime, the Post Keynesian policy regime does not 
devote monetary policy to fighting inflation (with the attendant risk of antagonizing inflation 
through the cost channel, and thus establishing a de-stabilizing dynamic). But as our results 
demonstrate, the target of monetary policy is not, in fact, the key driver of macroeconomic 
stability and the associated efficacy of inflation targeting. On the contrary, it has been shown that 
none of our results – including the instability introduced by more orthodox policy measures – is 
in any way affected by the magnitude of the cost channel. Put differently, neither the efficacy of a 
Post Keynesian policy regime, nor the superiority of this regime relative to a more orthodox 
policy mix, is influenced by the existence of a cost channel of monetary policy. 
This last point leads to a final and important conclusion when it is put into the context of 
Isaac’s (1991, p.93) earlier findings, that while “monetary policy rules are a crucial determinant 
of macroeconomic performance” and “stable macrodynamic behavior requires the 
implementation of activist policy,” only “accommodative [Post Keynesian] policies are 
stabilizing [whereas] ... monetarist policies are destabilizing.” Taken together with our own 
results, this suggests that: 
-  regardless of whether monetary policy is considered in isolation (as in Isaac, 1991) or as 
part of a broader policy regime (as in our own analysis); 
-  regardless of whether the instrument of monetary policy is the quantity of money in 
circulation (as in Isaac, 1991) or the interest rate (as in our own analysis); and   33 
-  regardless of whether or not a monetary policy conducted through the manipulation of 
interest rates is sensitive to the existence of the cost channel 
a robust finding of Post Keynesian macrodynamics is that in monetary production economies 
with conflicting claims inflation mechanisms,  more orthodox policy regimes have 
unambiguously negative consequences for macro stabilization. What is required for successful 
stabilization is activist macroeconomic policy that is properly attuned to the intrinsic structures 
and properties of the economy. 
  It is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to reflect at length on the implications of 
this last conclusion for recent macroeconomic events. However, it is tempting to conjecture that: 
i)  the Great Moderation was achieved neither through luck nor successful (orthodox) 
monetary policy so much as through changes to labour market institutions that 
resulted in the (unintentional?) creation of an “incomes policy based on fear,” that 
held quiescent conflicting claims inflation mechanisms even as economies such as the 
US neared capacity (Setterfield, 2007) 
ii)  the Great Recession represents, in some measure, the culmination of the inherent 
macroeconomic instability engendered by the pursuit of orthodox macroeconomic 
policies in a monetary production economy. 
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